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Abstract. Social capital is a multi-faceted concept and is connected to all human interactions. 
We have simplified human interaction among three agents (young, adult, and old) and tried to 
develop an economic approach between social capital investment and migration decisions in 
rural areas in Indonesia. We divided the investment of social capital among human interactions 
of three agents living in three periods using overlapping generation theory. Social capital is 
made up of optimal individual investment decisions and accumulation processes. By utilizing a 
prototype of optimal individual investment decisions and the process of social accumulation, 
social capital is eventually produced. Social capital is the total stock of social capital of each 
agent in one period considering, the rate of discount and afterward using the relation to 
calculate the parameters to measure the social tie effect (strong and weak tie). The investment 
period in social capital has affected the parameters when the investment of time increases; in 
this situation, the social capital investment effect becomes smaller. The study shows that when 
social ties in a region are weak, all agents migrate to seek higher wages. Furthermore, all 
agents migrate abroad when social ties are weak. The model shows that the decision (to migrate 
or to stay) is influenced by social capital investment. 
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Abstrak. Modal sosial merupakan suatu konsep multifaset dan terkait dengan semua interaksi 
manusia. Kami telah menyederhanakan interaksi manusia di antara tiga agen (muda, dewasa, 
dan tua) dan mencoba mengembangkan pendekatan ekonomi antara investasi modal sosial dan 
keputusan migrasi di daerah pedesaan di Indonesia. Kami membagi investasi modal sosial di 
antara interaksi manusia dari tiga agen yang hidup dalam tiga periode dengan menggunakan 
teori generasi yang tumpang tindih. Modal sosial terdiri dari keputusan investasi dan 
akumulasi investasi yang optimal. Dengan memanfaatkan prototip keputusan investasi individu 
yang optimal dan proses akumulasi sosial, modal sosial akhirnya dihasilkan. Modal sosial 
adalah total stok modal sosial setiap agen dalam satu periode yang dihitung, tingkat diskon, 
dan kemudian digunakan relasi untuk menghitung parameter dalam mengukur efek ikatan 
sosial (ikatan kuat dan lemah). Periode investasi pada modal sosial telah mempengaruhi 
parameter ketika investasi waktu tengah meningkat; dalam situasi ini, efek investasi modal 
sosial menjadi lebih kecil. Studi tersebut menunjukkan bahwa ketika ikatan sosial di suatu 
wilayah lemah, semua agen bermigrasi untuk mencari upah yang lebih tinggi. Selanjutnya, 
semua agen bermigrasi ke luar negeri saat ikatan sosial lemah. Model tersebut menunjukkan 
bahwa keputusan (bermigrasi atau tinggal) dipengaruhi oleh investasi modal sosial. 
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1 Urban and Regional Planning Department, Brawijaya University, Malang, Indonesia, E-mail: 
gunawan_p@ub.ac.id 
2 Graduate School of Management, Kyoto University, Japan  
152  Gunawan Prayitno, et al. 
 
 
Introduction 
Literature and references on social capital, which have grown enormously in recent years, 
disclose a disequilibrium between the relative lack of progressive development in measuring the 
concept and the volume of publications. Google Scholar gives more than 3,430,000 results for 
the search term “social capital”.  It is surprising that economists have not yet developed any 
profound and meaningful methodological approach to measure social capital, considering the 
quantitative traditions of economics (Jennings and Sanchez-Pages, 2017). 
Social capital is a broad field of abstraction; therefore, it can be represented by an extensive 
variety of proxies (Jennings and Sanchez-Pages, 2017) or theoretical representations (Sequeira 
and Lopes, 2011). Thus, it can have different impacts on the economy. The concept of social 
capital has interdisciplinary leverage as both sociology and political science are engaged in 
economic studies (Perez et al., 2006). It can be stated as a characteristic embedded in a given 
society, as written by Putnam et al. (1993), “social capital . . . refers to features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions.” Further studies on this variety of social capital are 
incorporated, for instance, in the abundance of literature on the effects of social networks, 
modeled as an asset in economics (Bofota, Boucekkine and Bala, 2012). On the opposite side of 
this definition, social capital, as a characteristic of the individual contributing to the evolution of 
the society, has been studied, for example, by Glaeser et al., (2002) and Fang and Loury (2004, 
2005). On the individual level, social capital can be formulated as the individual social 
attributes, such as social network belonging and social skills (Agenor and Dinh, 2015). In our 
findings, social capital affects the decision of individuals whether to migrate or stay in rural 
areas (Prayitno et al, 2014). 
Social capital, as a source of potential economic growth, is centered on the empirical level; its 
evidence is shown in the World Values Survey. This survey covers 29 market economies are 
encompassed in this study and are predicated on the constructed assessment of trust. Social 
capital has enabled developing villages into more productive and more financially beneficial 
villages, such as tourism villages, whilst also improving a threatened environment. It can be said 
that social capital is the driver of the carrying capacity of the region (Widhianthini 2017:2). The 
World Bank (2006), too, interpreted trust as one measurement of social capital, and the 
capability of a group of people to work collectively to reach mutual goals. Social capital is the 
stemming from trust in a society; a society that values trust will achieve more organizational 
innovations (Fukuyama, 1995; Sawitri and Soepriadi, 2014). The World Bank acknowledges 
social capital as one of the various kinds of capital, which it applies to quantify intangible 
capital. Research is undertaken as well on the connection between the diverse varieties of 
capital (social capital) and economic growth. One of these studies, published by Knack and 
Keefer (1997), explains a causal nexus between trust and growth. However, it did not find a 
very robust association. Temple and Johnson (1998), on the other hand, reveal that it is 
advantageous to utilize some measures of social capital and develop an index to forecast 
economic growth. Social capital and growth have been appraised in the majority of disciples in 
empirical studies (Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Rupasinga 2000; and Whiteley 2000) along with a 
broad range of point estimates. Empirical studies have also focused on the interaction of social 
capital and income, such as Fukuyama (1995), Robison and Siles (1999), Narayan and Pritchett 
(1999), and Putnam et al., (1993), with the social capital definition at the aggregate level.  
Some literature offers a scientific perspective of social capital in the theoretical construction of 
economic growth. Social capital is modeled on individual and aggregate levels, as Growiec and 
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Growiec (2012) show. They state that the comfort of establishing new interpersonal contacts 
(which is bridging social capital) is comparable to the existing group of contacts and the group 
of people with whom one is not yet introduced to but that might be taken into account. The 
cohort size, in turn, is defined by the total number of individuals in a society and, most 
significantly, determined by the degree of social trust. Bartolini and Bonatti (2008), applying an 
endogenous growth model, discovered a negative relationship between the extension of market-
related activities and social capital. Their model also shows that economic growth and social 
capital have a negative correlation. More interestingly, given that this model explains the 
findings of Putnam (2000), on a decline of social capital in the US, even though the nation-state 
had grown. Nevertheless, most preceding studies formulated social capital as an accumulable 
asset, proven to be useful in production (Asian Productivity Organization, 2006; Bisin and 
Guaitoli 2006; Glaeser et al., 2002). Antoci et al. (2007, 2009) modeled a negative relation 
between the stock of social capital and economic growth. A negative connection is found 
between the stock of social capital and economic growth (D’Andrea and Hare, 2004), since time 
dedicated to market activities takes time away from related social events, i.e. decreasing the 
amount of time people devote to invest in social capital. The connection of human capital and 
social capital in economic growth is of great significance but is frequently left underdeveloped. 
(Baliamoune-Lutz and Lutz, 2004). The social capital dimension used in these studies usually 
relates to the individual level. Glaeser et al., (2002) published a robust empirical correlation 
between human capital and membership of existing social organizations (the proxy utilized to 
calculate social capital). Glaeser and Redlick 2009 presented a theoretical framework to analyze 
the factors that affect social capital. The first step is an analysis of how social capital is 
eventually molded by utilizing a prototype of optimal individual investment decision and the 
process of social accumulation (Hamzah et al., 2016). 
Our research focuses on the relation of social and human capital in the migration decision model 
(Stutzer, 2010). The salient focus of our research is still rare in the theoretical discourse: the 
only literature we found so far on this matter is Bisin and Guaitoli’s (2006) working paper, an 
Overlapping Generations  (OLG) framework  (Piazza-Georgi, 2002), a working paper of Gentili 
and Ferreti (2012) and a working paper of Agénor and Dinh (2013). Bisin and Guaitoli (2006) 
are interested in how the roles of human and social capital differ in rural and urban communities 
(The Economic and Labour Relations Review, n.d.) Agénor and Dinh (2013) investigate the 
connections between social capital, human capital, and product imitation (implementation or 
innovation), in an Overlapping Generations (OLG) framework (Sarracino, 2013). Gentili and 
Ferreti (2012) explain dynamic migration focused on the accumulation process causing a 
variation in the distribution of income in the OLG model. 
To enrich the literature on this matter, we use empirical and theoretical frameworks on decision 
choices of social and human capital (migrate or stay) (Hofer and Aubert, 2013). Our analysis is 
different from Gentili and Ferreti (2012) because we did not use a dynamic migration model, we 
use overlapping generation (OLG) framework. The difference between Agénor and Dinh (2013) 
and our research is that we generate human capital by distributing it to the education sector and 
its social capital amount. We follow Bisin and Guaitoli (2006) that the growth of human capital 
can be proximate to a loss social capital or otherwise. Our approach emphasizes the economic 
dimension in two extents: first, by treating social capital as a product of an investment process 
or accumulation among individuals, which follows the logic of making people’s prospective 
utility as great as possible; and second by taking into account that economic relationships are 
pivotal in producing social capital in economic theory of maximization—on which they will 
base their decision between migrating or staying.  
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This paper is constructed based on the following arguments. The second section explains the 
reason behind the utilization of the Overlapping Generation (OLG) model. The third section 
envisages the primary assumptions that the recommended measure of social capital is based on 
the economic theory overlapping generation model. The fourth part of this paper builds the 
theoretical model, which explains the accumulated social capital stock from investments. The 
relation between social capitals investments in individuals and decisions (migrate or stay) is 
explained in this section. The fifth and final section consists of a summary and conclusions. 
Overlapping Generation Model 
This paper uses the overlapping generation model because in the real-world individuals have 
different stages of life-cycle interaction. While young, they interact with adults and the old 
generation. This feature is captured in the overlapping generation model where the life of 
individuals is divided into three periods. Thus, at any point in time, the economy may be 
composed of three cohorts, or generations: the young, adult and the old.  
The Model 
Developing a theoretical model through prototyping social capital as a product of accumulation 
among individuals, or the investment process, follows the logic that maximizing individuals' 
prospect utility is the primary objective. To reach this aim, we developed an overlapping 
generations model that explains the interaction between agents and how it relates to the decision 
to migrate or stay. 
Assumptions  
Consider an economy where three agents live. Each agent lives for three periods where is the 
respective periods are defined as the young generation, adult generation, and old generation. 
With only one agent born each period, we consider and overlap the generations model with 
three agents and three periods. 
Agents’ Behavior  
Every agent in the economy invests her time resource in either human capital formulation or 
social capital formation to maximize the (expected) utility. Her utility consists of sub-utility 
from social capital in the area she lives and goods consumption with wages from working. The 
assumption is that she can work only in the adult generation. Another assumption is that human 
capital investment positively influences her wage. Human capital accumulation is as follows:  ℎt+1  = δh𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡+1ℎ          (1) 
Where ht is human capital at period t (t =0,…, ∞), δ is the discount rate, and its human capital 
investment at period t. As all agents live for three generations, ht can be rewritten as ht (t = Y, 
A, O), where Y, A, O indicates each generation. She has a chance to work either in her home 
(H) or in a foreign (F) country, and she may get her salary either as ωH(hY) or ωF(hY). Wages 
in the adult generation are based upon the investment in her human capital in the young 
generation, and 𝜕𝜔𝐻 �ℎ𝑦� 𝜕ℎ𝑌 > 0⁄   (i = H, F) is assumed. Each agent is assumed to have an 
initial endowment for their human capital. The utility function is as follows.  𝑈𝑡 = 𝑢1(𝑐𝑡) + 𝑢2(𝑆𝐶𝑡) (𝑡 = 𝑌,𝐴,𝑂)      (2) 
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Her utility function Ut consists of 𝑆𝐶𝑡 = {𝑆𝐶𝑌 ∗ 𝑆𝐶𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝐶𝑂} α from the sub-utility from 
consumption u1(ct) and from social capital u2(SCt). ct is the amount of consumption in the t 
generation, and SCt is the extent of social capital in  the region she lives in. Social capital in the region SCt is given below. 
 𝑆𝐶𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝑆𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡+1𝑠          (3) 
𝐼𝑡
𝑠 is the social capital investment at period t. We also assume that each agent has social 
endowment SCY0. In each period, every agent decides to allocate her time resource either for 
human capital investment or social capital investment. Assuming that she has 1 endowment as 
time resource, and she decides to allocate time et for social capital investment, and 1 - et for 
human capital investment, where 0 ≤ et  ≤ 1, (t = Y, A, O). As a result, both human capital 
investment and social capital investment are a function of et, It(et) and SCt(et). 
Concerning the definition of agents’ behavior in the old generation, there is no chance for agents 
in the old generation to work, as shown in the formula below.  
Country is defined as, 
 max𝑒𝑂 𝑈𝑂 =𝑢1(𝑐𝑂) + 𝑢2(𝑆𝐶 )       (4) 
Subject to  
𝑌𝑂 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑐𝑂          (5) 
Y0 is her income in the old generation, and p is the price for a single good which is normalized 
as p = 1. Her time allocation for capital investment is decided through budget constraint.  
Solving this optimization problem leads to indirect utility function 𝑉0(𝑒0∗). As there is no 
transfer to other agents after she dies, there are no incentives to invest in human capital in the 
old generation, 𝑒0 = 1 . Hereafter * indicates the optimized result. 
In the adult generation, she has the chance to migrate and work in a foreign country. A higher 
wage is possible if she operates in a foreign country. Wage is defined as 𝜔𝑘(𝑘 = 𝐻,𝐹), where 
H is the home country and F is the foreign country. Without loss of generality, 𝜔𝐻 < 𝜔𝐹. Upon 
migrating to a foreign country, her expected utility is expressed as follows. 
𝐸𝑈𝐴
𝐹 = 𝑢1(𝑐𝐴) + 𝑢2(𝑆𝐶𝐹) + 𝛿𝑉𝑂       (6) 
She maximizes the utility above with the budget constraint 𝑌𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝑠𝐴,  where 𝑠𝐴 shows 
saving for an adult generation. Obviously, there are no incentives to save her money for the next 
generation as consumption in earlier the generation brings about a higher utility if the amount of 
consumption is the same. Thus, 𝑠𝐴= 0  
𝑌𝐴 = 𝜔𝐹 = 𝑐𝐴          (7) 
By maximizing the expected utility function (7) with her budget constraint (8), the indirect 
utility 𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐹 can be calculated. 
Likewise, the utility maximization problem of agents deciding not to move and stay in their 
home country is defined as  
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 max  𝐸𝑈𝐴𝐻 = 𝑢1(𝑐𝐴) + 𝑢2(𝑆𝐶𝐻) + 𝛿𝑉𝑂       (8) 
with 
 𝑌𝐴 = 𝜔𝐻 = 𝑐𝐴          (9) 
There is a possibility of a higher sub-utility from social capital in her home country than in the 
foreign country due to her investment in the social capital and social network of her country, 
which is greater than the social network in the foreign one. To create a more simple discussion, 
we assume that SCF = 0 and remove the superscription H from SCH. By solving the problem 
above, indirect utility EVAF is derived. Human capital investment in the adult generation does not 
have any effect on her age, 𝑒𝐴∗ = 1. As a result, her optimal decision is to migrate when 
𝐸𝑉𝐴
𝐹  ≥  𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐻, and to stay in her home country when 𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐹 > 𝐸𝑉𝐴𝐻. 
In the young generation, she has no income yet as it is not allowed to work in the young 
generation, so 𝑐𝑌 = 0. The investment in her human capital has a positive effect on her wage in 
the adult generation, while the investment in social capital has a positive effect on social capital 
in the region. She will decide her time allocation in the young generation by considering the 
balance. Her behavior in the adult generation is written as follows. 
 max𝑒𝑌 𝐸𝑈𝑌 = 𝑢2(𝑆𝐶 ) + 𝛿 max [𝐸𝑈𝐴𝐹 ,𝐸𝑈𝐴𝐻]            (10) 
Equilibrium  
Instantaneous utility in the young and old generations is common in both migrant workers 
moving to a foreign country in the adult generation and those who stay their home country. 
Thus, she decides her time allocation in the young generation 𝑒𝑌 and whether or not to migrate 
by comparing the following expected utility (Gunawan, 2015). 
𝐸�𝑈𝐴
𝐹 = 𝑢1(𝜔𝐹(𝑒𝑌))            (11a) 
𝐸�𝑈𝐴
𝐻 = 𝑢1�𝜔𝐻(𝑒𝑌)� + 𝑢1(𝑆𝐶)       (11b) 
In order simplify the discussion, following assumptions are made: 
𝐼𝑡(𝑒𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒𝑡          (12a) 
𝑆𝐶𝑡(𝑒𝑡) = 𝑒𝑡          (12b) 
𝑢1(𝑐) = 𝑐         (12c) 
𝑢2(𝑆𝐶) = 𝑆𝐶         (12d) 
Let us define the new functions as follows 
𝑔(𝑒𝑌) = 𝑆𝐶  (𝑒𝑌)        (13a) 
𝑓(𝑒𝑌) = 𝜔𝐹(𝑒𝑌) −𝜔𝐻(𝑒𝑌)       (13b) 
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𝑔(⋅) is the monotonically increasing function from the definition of the social capital function 
(3). 𝜔𝑖(⋅) (I = F, H) is the monotonically decreasing function from the definition of wages 
function. Also, we assume that 𝑓(𝑒𝑌)/𝜕𝑒𝑌 < 0. This assumption shows that the marginal effect 
of human capital investment to the wage is higher for her wage in a foreign country than that in-
home country. We can explain this relation more detail in Figure 1. The function of 𝑔(𝑒𝑌) is a 
monotonic increasing function, where 𝜕𝑆𝐶
𝜕𝑒𝑌
�  0−1 > 0 , or 𝜕𝑔(𝑒𝑌)𝜕𝑒𝑌 > 0, �0 < 𝑒𝑌 < 1� (Prayitno, 
2015). 
 
 
Figure 1. Correlation between 𝒇(𝒆𝒀) and 𝒈(𝒆𝒀).  
 
Now we have a unique equilibrium for the following 3 cases. 
 
[Case 1]  f(0) < g (0) 
In this case, 𝑔(∙) is always larger than 𝑓(∙). for f(0) < g (0) any 0 ≤ 𝑒𝑌 ≤ 1.  All agents stay in 
their home country and 𝑒𝑌∗ = 1. 
[Case 2]  f(1) > g (1) 
  
 𝑓(∙)is always larger than 𝑔(∙) for any  0 ≤ 𝑒𝑌 ≤ 1.   All agents migrate to the foreign country 
and 𝑒𝑌∗ = 0.   
[Case 3]  f(0) ≥ g (0) and f(1) ≤  g (1) 
 
There is a threshold 𝑒𝑌���(0 ≤ 𝑒𝑌��� ≤ 1) which satisfies 𝐸�𝑈𝐴𝐹 = 𝐸�𝑈𝐴𝐻 in this case. When f (0) ≥ 
g(1), all agents migrate and 𝑒𝑌∗ = 0. When f (0) ≥ g(1) all agents stay in their home country and 
𝑒𝛾
∗ = 1 (Gunawan, 2015). 
 
Social Tie and Migration Decision  
 
In the effect of social tie and migration decision, (3), (α ≥ 1) indicates the level of a social tie in 
the region. It is possible to have different equilibriums for different α.  The threshold ᾱ where 
staying in the home country and migrating abroad is indifferent for agents. Firstly, it is easily 
shown that function (14a) is increasing function in α, and function (14b) is independent from α. 
In order to guarantee the existence of ᾱ, the expected utility of migration 𝐸�𝑈𝐴𝐹should be smaller 
than that of staying in the home country 𝐸�𝑈𝐴𝐹 when α = 1. This condition can be rewritten as 
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 𝑓(0) − 𝑔(0)|𝛼=1 ≥ 0. With the simple calculation of equations (3), (13a) and (13b), we can 
calculate 𝑔(𝑒𝑌) and 𝑓(𝑒𝑌). 
 
𝑔(𝑒𝑌) = 𝑆𝐶  (𝑒𝑌) = {𝑆𝐶𝑌 ∗ 𝑆𝐶𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝐶𝑂} α  
     = (𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 𝑒𝑌) α ∗(𝑆𝐶𝐴 + 𝑒𝐴) α ∗ (𝑆𝐶𝑂 + 𝑒𝑂) α 
    = (𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 𝑒𝑌) α ∗(𝛿𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 1 + 𝛿𝑒𝑌) α ∗ (𝛿2𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 𝛿 + 1 + 𝛿2𝑒𝑌) α 
          = [𝛿3𝑒𝑌3 + (3𝛿3𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 𝛿 + 2𝛿2)𝑒𝑌2 + {(2𝛿3 + 3𝛿2 + 2𝛿)𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 1 + 𝛿}𝑒𝑌 +
𝛿2𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 1 + 𝛿]α 
 
When 𝑒𝑌 = 0 and α = 1, 𝑔(𝑒𝑌) = 𝛿2𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 1 + 𝛿   and 𝑓(𝑒𝑌) = 𝜔𝐹(0) − 𝜔𝐻(0), and 
we have the following condition. 
𝜔𝐹(0) − 𝜔𝐻(0) > 𝛿2𝑆𝐶𝑌0 + 1 + 𝛿      (14) 
   
This shows that when the wage difference is big enough, and the discount rate is small enough, 
a threshold of ᾱ exists. When the social tie is not strong in the region, all migrate to seek higher 
wage, and all agents stay in their home country when the social tie is strong. 
The propositions are summarized below:  
[Proposition 1] 
A unique threshold ᾱ exists when conditions (refc) is satisfied. 
[Proposition 2] 
When the social tie in the region is strong enough (α ≥ ᾱ), all agents in the region stay in their 
home country. As a result, no migration equilibrium is observed. When the social tie in the 
region is weak (α < ᾱ), all agents in the region migrate to work in the foreign country. 
From the propositions above, we can conclude that ‘communities and households with higher 
social capital will not send their family members as migrant workers.' 
Conclusion  
In this paper, a methodological theory to measure social capital investment is developed. We 
showed the investment of social capital among interactions of three agents living in three 
periods in an overlapping generation. Social capital is molded by utilizing a model of optimal individual investment decision and the process of social accumulation. Social capital is the 
total stock of social capital from each agent in one period considering the discount rate. From 
this correlation, we could calculate the parameter to measure the social tie effect.  
When social capital is a monotonically increasing function, wages is a monotonically decreasing 
function and 𝜕𝑓(𝑒𝑌)/𝜕𝑒𝑌 < 0; the assumption shows that the marginal effect of human capital 
investment on the wage is higher for her wage in a foreign country than that in the home 
country. We have a unique equilibrium for the following 3 cases: (i) case 1: 𝑓(0) < 𝑔(0).  In 
this case, 𝑔(∙) is always larger than 𝑓(∙) for any 0 ≤ 𝑒𝑌 ≤ 1. All agents stay in their home 
country and 𝑒𝑌∗ = 1. (ii) case 2: 𝑓(1) < 𝑔(1). In this case, 𝑓(∙) is always larger than 𝑔(∙) for 
any 0 ≤ 𝑒𝑌 ≤ 1. All agents migrate to the foreign country and 𝑒𝑌∗ = 0.   And   (iii) Case 3:  
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f(0) ≥ g(0)and f(1) ≥ g(1). There exist a threshold 𝑒𝑌���(0 ≤ 𝑒𝑌��� ≤ 1) which satisfies 
𝐸�𝑈𝐴
𝐹=𝐸�𝑈𝐴𝐻 in this case. When f(0) ≥ g(0), all agents migrate and 𝑒𝑌∗ = 0. When f(0) < g(1), , 
all agents stay in their home country and 𝑒𝑌∗ = 1  (Gunawan, 2015). 
As a summary of this paper, the following propositions is presented. Proposition 1: A unique 
threshold ᾱ exists when conditions: (i) social capital function is increasing function in α; (ii) 
wage function is decreasing function and independent from α; and (iii) 𝑓(0) − 𝑔(0)|𝛼=1 ≥0, are satisfied; and Proposition 2: When social tie in the region is strong enough α ≥ 𝛼�), all 
agents in the region stay in their home country. As a result, no migration equilibrium is 
observed. When the social tie in the region is weak (α < 𝛼�), all agents in the region migrate to 
work in the foreign country. This paper has tried to illuminate the connection between social capital and migration 
decisions. We could prove the concept of social capital as social cohesion and represent as 
bonding social capital. Because there are two concepts of bridging and making ties of social capital, we should supplement the concept of bridging social capital in the model. This is the 
concern of our upcoming research. 
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